

## ON 'PLUTARCH', *DE LIBIDINE ET AEGRITUDINE* 9

'Οσοι τοῦνυν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄφθαρτον οὐδ' ἀθάνατον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπαθὴ πειρῶνται διαφυλάττειν, ῥώμην τινὰ τὴν ἀπάθειαν τῇ ἀφθαρσίᾳ προβαλλόμενοι καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἁμωσγέπως ἤδη φθορᾶς ἀναδέχεσθαι πείραν οἰόμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάθη πάντα καὶ τὰς ἀσθενείας ὥσπερ ἐκ ῥίξης τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναβλαστάνειν ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν διαφορῶν πρῶτον ἔξονται τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα φαινομένων κατὰ χρόνους καὶ φύσεις καὶ μεταβολάς.<sup>1</sup>

τὴν ἀπάθειαν τῇ ἀφθαρσίᾳ Hartman<sup>2</sup> : τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν codd.

We must return to the transmitted reading, which is beyond objection. The persons referred to in 'Οσοι want to establish that passivity, the experiencing of desire, grief, and the like, is a thing of the body and not of the soul, which, they maintain, is ἀπαθής. The climactic οὐκ . . . μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . structure makes it plain enough that what is in dispute and has to be proved is that the soul is ἀπαθής, and that what is assumed for the proof is that it is ἄφθαρτος. It is, therefore, wrong to change the text so as to make those engaging in the proof try to argue from ἀπάθεια to ἀφθαρσία instead of the other way round.

But there is a still stronger case against Hartman's conjecture: it destroys a formally good argument and puts a defective one in its place. The two arguments, that of the transmitted text and that of Hartman–Sandbach, can be represented syllogistically. τὸ πάσχον . . . πείραν yields the major premiss 'All that is passive (τὸ πάσχον in force = τὸ μὴ ἀπαθές) is corruptible'; the minor premiss and the conclusion are hidden in ῥώμην . . . προβαλλόμενοι.<sup>3</sup>

Taking A = τὸ πάσχον (τὸ μὴ ἀπαθές), B = φθορᾶς ἀναδεχόμενον πείραν (= οὐκ ἄφθαρτον), and C = ἡ ψυχή, and understanding A and B to have appropriate form in each place, we get:

- |                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| (1) from the transmitted text | All A is (some) B<br>All C is not B              |
|                               | <hr/>  |
|                               | All C is not A ;                                 |
| (2) from Hartman–Sandbach     | All A is (some) <sup>4</sup> B<br>All C is not A |
|                               | <hr/>  |
|                               | All C is not B                                   |

In (1) the soul's ἀφθαρσία is well used as ῥώμη for its ἀπάθεια; in (2) ἀπάθεια proves an inadequate prop for ἀφθαρσία.

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<sup>1</sup> I give the text of F.H. Sandbach, *Plutarch's Moralia, Fragments* (London 1969) (vol. XV of the Loeb *Moralia*), 56. M. Pohlenz (Teubner 1953) and K. Zeigler, who revised Pohlenz's text (1959), also accept Hartman's conjecture as a correction.

<sup>2</sup> J.J. Hartman, *De Plutarcho scriptore et philosopho* (Leiden 1916), 633–4. Hartman says only 'Immo vero τὴν ἀπάθειαν τῇ ἀφθαρσίᾳ nam ἡ ἀπάθεια firmam tutamque reddit τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν (sic)'. We are not told why Sandbach accepted the result of this prejudice.

Both Pohlenz, in his *apparatus*, (so too Ziegler) and Sandbach refer to Plot. 3. 6(1), mysteriously as far as the textual point is concerned: Plot. 3. 6. 1, properly understood, supports the manuscript reading here; not that any external support is needed.

<sup>3</sup> In the manuscripts the soul's ἀφθαρσία, in Hartman–Sandbach its ἀπάθεια, is granted for a premiss.

<sup>4</sup> For this syllogism to be valid the major premiss should assure us, either that 'All A is all B' or, more naturally, that 'All B is A'.